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Note
The RIAA Litigation War on File Sharing and Alternatives
More Compatible With Public Morality
Daniel Reynolds*
INTRODUCTION
The Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA)’s lawsuit campaign against copyright-infringing file
sharing is controversial. Many critics allege that this
campaign is unfair and paint the RIAA as mean and a
bully. Some critics even claim that the RIAA is subversive
toward the rights of the public. At the same time, many
file sharers continue to violate the distribution and
reproduction rights of copyright holders, record labels,
and artists, all who have justified expectations of payment
for their products.
This Note examines the RIAA’s approach and
alternative approaches to the file sharing problem, and
proposes an integrated, comprehensive strategy for
dealing with the problem of illegal file sharing. Part I
provides a background on the RIAA and its opinions, the
development of the RIAA lawsuits, the public backlash
against these lawsuits, and the relevant law. Part II
describes the challenges to be met by any solution to the
file sharing problem, reviews a series of proposals for their
strengths and weaknesses, and sets forth a strategy that
balances the strengths of a number of previous proposals
against each other’s weaknesses. This Note concludes
with the assertion that the file sharing problem is solvable
without wasteful, unpopular lawsuits or major changes to
the law, provided that the music industry is willing to
adapt to and take cues from the consuming public.

*
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* Daniel Reynolds is a J.D. candidate (2009) at the University of
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I. THE RIAA, MUSIC FILE SHARING LITIGATION, PUBLIC
BACKLASH, AND THE LAW

A. THE RIAA

AND ITS

OPINIONS

ON

MUSIC FILE SHARING

The RIAA is a trade group, representing the U. S.
recording
industry.1
Its
membership
creates,
manufactures, or distributes an overwhelming majority of
the audio recordings produced and sold in the United
States.2 Its avowed mission is “to foster a business and
legal climate that supports and promotes [its] members’
creative and financial vitality.”3 To that end, it labors to
protect intellectual property rights.4
The RIAA’s view of sharing copyrighted music files is,
some believe, harsh. The RIAA calls this sharing “online
piracy” and describes it as “the unauthorized uploading of
a copyrighted sound recording and making it available to
the public, or downloading a sound recording from an
Internet site, even if the recording isn’t resold.”5 The RIAA
characterizes sharing copyrighted music files as a kind of
theft6 and claims that millions of dollars and investment in
the future of music are both jeopardized by the practice.7
As part of its work to protect intellectual property
rights, the RIAA is waging a “multi-faceted” campaign
against “online theft of music.”8 That campaign includes
offering legal alternatives to music fans, educating music
fans about intellectual property, and litigating on behalf of
member companies.9 The RIAA’s stated goal for this multifaceted campaign is to protect the industry’s capacity to
invest in new artists and nurture the development of legal
online services.10
1
1

. RIAA, Who We Are, http://www.riaa.com/aboutus.php (last
visited Mar. 21, 2008).
2
2
. Id.
3
3
. Id.
4
4
. Id.
5
5
. RIAA, Piracy: Online, http://riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php?content_
selector=piracy_details_online (last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
6
6
. RIAA, Piracy: Online and On the Street, http://riaa.com/physical
piracy.php (last visited Sept. 13, 2007).
7
7
. RIAA, supra note 5.
8
8
. Id.
9
9
. Id.
1
10
. RIAA, supra note 6.
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The RIAA devotes a page of its website to setting forth
its view of copyright law.11 As the RIAA explains, making
unauthorized copies of audio recordings is stealing.12 To
make or distribute recordings illegally is to take
something of value from the copyright holder without
permission.13 Copyright infringement carries with it
potential civil and criminal liability.14 The RIAA implies that
the penalties are likely to be severe.15
The RIAA believes it is easy to break the law. Emailing
music files to others; ripping an MP3 from a purchased
CD, then making the file available over a network;
downloading music others have made available over a
network, regardless of whether one offers music in return;
joining a network for a fee to download or upload music
without authorization; and sharing music without
authorization via instant messaging are all examples of
wrongful conduct.16
The RIAA strategy of bringing lawsuits is not without
foundation. The notion of “private attorney general”
action, in which private civil suits become a tool for
teaching obedience to the law is not novel, nor is it devoid
of adherents.17 At least one law professor has endorsed
the RIAA litigation strategy as likely to promote
deterrence.18 At least one member of the legal community
has endorsed the litigation as necessary to promote
respect for copyright in light of the failure of moral
11

. RIAA,
The
Law,
http://riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php?
content_selector= piracy_online_the_law (last visited Sept. 30, 2007).
12
. Id. (“When you make illegal copies of someone’s creative work,
you are stealing and breaking the law.”)
13
. Id.
14
. Id.
15
. See Id. (“Don’t you have a better way to spend five years and
$250,000?”). Penalties for a first-time offender can be as high as
$250,000 and five years of incarceration. Id. The site does not mention
how likely such a high penalty would be, or what conditions would
prompt it, leaving the impression that it might be assessed against
anyone—even a marginal downloader.
16
. Id.
17
. David W. Opderbeck, Peer-to-Peer Networks, Technological
Evolution, and Intellectual Property Reverse Private Attorney General
Litigation, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1685, 1685–96 (2005).
18
. Matthew Sag, Piracy: Twelve Year-Olds, Grandmothers, and
Other Good Targets for the Recording Industry’s File Sharing Litigation,
4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 133, 155 (2006).
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B. MUSIC FILE SHARING LITIGATION
The recording industry fired its first shots in the file
sharing litigation war against peer-to-peer (P2P) file
sharing networks, rather than individual users. In 2000,
the industry brought suit against Napster, alleging
contributory and vicarious violation of copyright.20 The
Ninth Circuit ordered Napster to make sure that no
copyrighted work owned by the plaintiffs would be
uploaded or downloaded on Napster without the
permission of the copyright holders.21
After the Napster decision, file sharing changed. In
2003, Grokster and StreamCast evaded the judgment that
befell Napster.22 They escaped because, unlike Napster,
they were not centralized.23 Instead, these services, and
others like them, allowed users to share files without first
transferring information identifying the files to a space
under the service’s control.24
Eventually, the Grokster plaintiffs prevailed.25 The
Supreme Court held that “one who distributes a device
with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright . . . is liable for the resulting acts of
infringement by third parties.”26 Going to the Grokster URL
now brings up a page with an ominous warning: “Don’t
think you can’t get caught. You are not anonymous.”27
19

. Stacey M. Lantagne, The Morality of MP3s: The Failure of the
Recording Industry’s Plan of Attack, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 269, 270, 284–
88 (2004).
20
. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900
(N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 239 F. 3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001).
21
. Id. at 927.
22
. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F.
Supp. 2d 1029, 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2003), aff’d 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.
2004), vacated, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
23
. Id. at 1039–42.
24
. Id.
25
. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
913 (2005).
26
. Id. at 936–37.
27
. Grokster, http://www.grokster.com/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).
After mentioning the Supreme Court’s decision that using Grokster and
other services like it to trade copyrighted files is illegal, the page
displays the user’s IP address and gives the above message. Id.
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In the meantime, however, the RIAA began targeting
individual users as part of their strategy against copyright
infringement.28 In September of 2003, the RIAA filed
lawsuits against 261 individuals it accused of uploading
files in violation of copyright law.29 The recording industry
has filed about 26,000 file sharing suits since 2003.30
On his blog, Recording Industry vs The People,
attorney Ray Beckerman, who has defended individuals
against the RIAA, documents the process the RIAA uses to
prosecute its lawsuits.31 Although the suits are often
described as being against “downloaders,” that label is
misleading. The RIAA does not know if there has been any
downloading when it starts a suit.32 As Beckerman states,
“[i]t is more accurate to refer to the cases as cases
against persons who paid for internet access which the
RIAA has reason to believe was used by some person . . .
to engage in peer to peer file sharing.”33 To put it another
way, the suits are more precisely concerned with
uploading than with downloading.
The RIAA lawsuit process begins with a suit against
anonymous defendants.34 After obtaining an ex parte
order—an order obtained without notice to or the
presence of an opposing party—the RIAA sends a
subpoena to a defendant’s Internet Service Provider (ISP)
to get the allegedly wrongdoing ISP customer’s name and
address.35 The RIAA then drops the “John Doe” suit and
pursues the ISP customer.36 When the RIAA sues college
28

. Benny Evangelista, Online Music Finally Starts to Rock ‘N’ Roll:
Industry Punishes Downloaders While Getting Into the Act Itself, S.F.
CHRON., Dec. 29, 2003, at E1.
29
. Dan Thanh Dang, Recording Industry Sues 261 for Piracy:
Association Also Offering Music-Swapping Amnesty, BALT. SUN, Sept. 9,
2003, at 1A.
30
. Joshua Freed, Record Companies Win Music Sharing Trial,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 5, 2007.
31
. Ray Beckerman, How the RIAA Litigation Process Works, Jan. 11,
2008, http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/2007/01/how-riaalitigation-process-works.html.
32
. Id.
33
. Id.
34
. Id. at “Ex Parte Discovery—The ‘John Doe’ Phase.”
35
. ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, RIAA V. THE PEOPLE: FOUR YEARS LATER 1,
http://w2.eff.org/IP/P2P/riaa_at_four.pdf [hereinafter RIAA V. PEOPLE] ;
Beckerman, supra note 31, at “Ex Parte Discovery—The ‘John Doe’
Phase.”
36
. RIAA V. PEOPLE, supra note 35, at 5; Beckerman, supra note 31,
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students, a college or university—instead of a
conventional ISP—is subject to an ex parte hearing.37 The
RIAA has encountered more resistance from these
educational institutions than it has from conventional
ISPs.38
In the next phase of the litigation, the RIAA sends the
ISP customer a letter offering a settlement.39 Typically, the
settlement offered is $3750, nonnegotiable, and contains
a number of one-sided provisions, including “a
representation that peer to peer file sharing of
copyrighted music is a copyright infringement.”40 The
RIAA encourages early settle-ments and has set up a
website for making early settlements.41
In the absence of a settlement, the RIAA brings a suit
against the now-known defendant.42 The complaint
features a list of songs alleged to exist in the defendant’s
shared files folder and a second list of songs which the
RIAA’s investigators allegedly downloaded from the
defendant’s computer.43
“If the defendant defaults, plaintiffs apply for, and
apparently usually obtain, a default judgement, . . . for
$750 per song . . . [,] over 1000 times the 70-cent amount
for which the license to the song could have been
purchased.”44 Default judgments may be likely in RIAA
cases because of the economic burden of obtaining legal

at “Ex Parte Discovery—The ‘John Doe’ Phase.”
37
. Id.
38
. Id. In at least one case, a motion for an ex parte hearing has
been dismissed sua sponte. In others, the ex parte motions have been
challenged. Id. But see RIAA V. PEOPLE, supra note 35, at 9–10
(characterizing university and college response as varied and
ambivalent).
39
. Beckerman, supra note 31, at “Pre-Lawsuit Settlement Phase.”
40
. Id. This representation is troubling because it does not violate
copyright to share copyrighted files with permission. Also, settlement
amounts may be as high as $11,000. RIAA V. PEOPLE, supra note 35.
41
. Beckerman, supra note 31, at “Pre-Lawsuit Settlement Phase.”
This program has been criticized as a sham that gets users to
incriminate themselves because it does not bind the copyright holders.
RIAA V. PEOPLE, supra note 35, at 5.
42
. Beckerman, supra note 31, at “Litigations Against Named
Defendants.”
43
. Id.
44
. Id.
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representation.45
As soon as possible, the RIAA serves pretrial discovery
requests, seeking to examine, among other things, the
accused’s hard drive.46 If this tactic does not turn up
evidence of copyright infringement, the RIAA seeks to
depose others who may have used the Internet account
(e.g., family members), and may claim spoliation of
evidence or that the accused has switched hard drives.47
Instead of attempting to prove damages, the RIAA
routinely seeks statutory damages of $750 per song.48
This damages theory is being challenged on statutory and
constitutional grounds.49 Sometimes the RIAA offers a
nonnegotiable settlement during the course of litigation
for a substantially greater dollar amount than the prelitigation offer.50 In an October, 2007, case, the only
widely publicized case of an RIAA lawsuit running to trial
completion, the plaintiffs obtained an enormous, and
possibly unfair, judgment against the defendant.51

C. PUBLIC BACKLASH

AND

PUBLIC MORALITY

Defendants have fought back against the RIAA in
court with challenges including complaint sufficiency,

45

. See id. (noting the economic burden of obtaining representation
and advising pro se litigants as to options and tactics); RIAA V. PEOPLE,
supra note 35, at 6 (noting the cost of settling is likely to be lower than
that of fighting the suit or suffering a default judgment).
46
. Beckerman, supra note 31, at “Litigations Against Named
Defendants.”
47
. Id.
48
. Id.
49
. Id. A court may reduce statutory damages to $200 where an
infringer proves that he or she “was not aware and had no reason to
believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright.”
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2000). The Supreme Court has held that
excessive punitive damages violate the Constitution’s guarantees of
due process. See generally J. Cam Barker, Note, Grossly Excessive
Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-Sharing: The Troubling Effects
of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for Copyright Infringement,
83 TEX. L. REV. 525, 537–41 (2004).
50
. Beckerman, supra note 31, at “Litigations Against Named
Defendants” ( “[T]ypically $4500 plus $375 court costs . . . .”).
51
. Freed, supra note 30. In Duluth, Minnesota, a $222,000
judgment was assessed against a woman who “lives from paycheck to
paycheck.” Id.; Virgin Records America, Inc. v. Thomas, No. 06-1497,
slip op. at 1 (D. Minn. 2007).
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affirmative defenses, and counterclaims.52 Also, critics
have publicly attacked the RIAA and its lawsuits. The
subject matter of the attacks range from the RIAA’s choice
of litigation targets and tactics to the RIAA’s view of the
law. The following quote is emblematic of the criticism:
It’s as if the music companies spent months with focus groups,
developing a strategy most likely to piss off and alienate the
demographic that is most likely to purchase their products. . . .
[W]hen your values pit massive corporations against high school
kids, single moms and G.I.s, you have to wonder about the
underlying strategy.53

The RIAA has taken criticism for pursuing a U.S.
serviceman (and threatening to expose sexually explicit
files on his computer).54 Other unpopular targets are
teenagers, college students, parents, grandparents,
disabled persons, and deceased persons.55 Even if the
strategy is sound from the standpoint of rational
deterrence,56 that fact does not guarantee that the public
will or should approve.57
The litigation targets report feeling violated and
otherwise treated unfairly by the lawsuits and the tactics
used. They characterize the damages as too high,
52

. Beckerman, supra note 31, at “Litigations Against Named
Defendants”; Ryan Carter, RIAA, extortion, and conspiracy, in the same
sentence,
http://www.downloadsquad.com/2007/06/06/riaa-extortionand-conspiracy-in-the-same-sentence/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2007);
Grant
Robertson,
Downloader
fights
back
against
RIAA,
http://www.Downloadsquad.
com/2007/01/31/downloader-fights-backagainst-riaa/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2007).
53
. Eric Eggertson, RIAA Isn’t Trying to Win a Popularity Contest
(Maybe
it
Should
Consider
Trying),
http://www.commonsensepr.com/2007/07/30/riaa-isnt-trying-to-win-apopularity-contest-maybe-it-should-consider-trying/ (last visited Sept.
19, 2007).
54
. Eric Bangeman, RIAA Backtracks After Embarrassing P2P
Defendant,
ARS
TECHNICA,
July
30,
2007,
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070730-riaa-backtracks-afterembarrassing-p2p-defendant.html.
55
. RIAA V. PEOPLE, supra note 35, at 6–8; Beckerman, supra note
31, at “Litigations Against Named Defendants”; Grant Robertson, RIAA
targets
college
students,
again,
http://www.downloadsquad.com/2007/03/09/riaa-targets-collegestudents-again/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2007); Sag, supra note 19, at
146–47.
56
. Sag, supra note 18, at 145–52.
57
. See id. at 155 (“There may be social welfare or public policy
considerations that cast the . . . tactic of end user litigation in a
negative light”).
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particularly in light of the non-commercial nature of the
file sharing or the status of the defendants.58 Defendants
have alleged trespass, fraud, unfair trade practices,
extortion, conspiracy, and defamation against the RIAA.59
Journalists, public interest groups, and other public
commentators have offered similar criticisms.60 Practicing
lawyers have characterized RIAA tactics as violative of
procedural rights.61 At the same time, RIAA critics have
voiced respect for intellectual property rights and for the
profit interests of content producers.62 Therefore, the
criticism should not be dismissed as mere quarreling with
the existence of intellectual property or the commerciality
of music.
Critics have also taken issue with the RIAA’s view of
the law. The Computer & Communications Industry
Association and the U.S. Internet Association, both trade
groups, along with the Electronic Frontier Foundation
(EFF), a public interest group, have attacked the RIAA’s
theory that making copyrighted files available for
downloading constitutes infringement.63 Critics have also
challenged the RIAA’s view that copyright infringement is
theft.64 Some criticism has focused on the RIAA’s
58

. See, e.g., Freed, supra note 30; Anna Jo Bratton, Lawsuits
trouble
music
downloaders,
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2007-05-13-down
loading_n.htm
(last visited Sept. 24, 2007).
59
. Carter, supra note 52; Robertson, supra note 52.
60
. See, e.g., RIAA V. PEOPLE, supra note 35, at 4, 6–8; Press
Release, ACLU, Citing Right to Anonymity Online, ACLU Asks Boston
Court to Block Recording Industry Subpoena (Sept. 29, 2003), available
at http://www.aclu. org/privacy/anon/15590prs20030929.html; BoycottRIAA, Our Mission, http:// www.boycott-riaa.com/mission (last visited
Oct. 7, 2007); Carter, supra note 52; Jon Newton, RIAA - Recording
Infamy Ass of America, http://www.p2pnet. net/story/13570 (last visited
Oct. 7, 2007).
61
. See, e.g., Beckerman, supra note 31.
62
. See, e.g., Barker, supra note 49, at 525; Boycott-RIAA, supra
note 60; Bratton, supra note 58; Fred von Lohmann, Copyright Silliness
on Campus, WASH. POST, June 6, 2007, at A23.
63
. Boycott-RIAA, On the Importance of Elektra v. Barker,
http://www.boycott-riaa.com/article/19960 (last visited Oct. 11, 2007).
Amicus
curiae
briefs
are
available
at
http://info.riaalawsuits.us/documents.htm# Elektra_v_Barker.
64
. See, e.g., Eliot Van Buskirk, The RIAA Lawsuits Clarified Once
and for All, http://reviews.cnet.com/4520-6450_7-5081098-1.html?
tag=feat.1 (last visited Sept. 13, 2007); Stephen Dionne, Letter to the
Editor:
RIAA
Crackdown
Attacks
“Creative
Freedom,”
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perceived hijacking of copyright law to the detriment of
the public.65
Besides these criticisms, there is other evidence of
the failure of the RIAA to successfully appeal to public
morality over file sharing. Despite the lawsuits, file
sharing continues to grow66 and commercial online music
services lag behind.67 There is the widespread belief that
copyright
infringement
is
not
immoral.68
Even
sophisticated members of the public may hold this view.69
Lastly, there is the belief that the recording industry is a
hypocritical bully deserving to have its intellectual
property infringed.70

D. THE PERTINENT COPYRIGHT LAW
Despite what critics of the RIAA may believe, sharing
copyrighted music files without authorization is
infringement.71 Reproduction and distribution are among
the exclusive rights vested in an author at the moment a
work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression.72 The
obvious interpretation is that downloading is a kind of
reproduction and uploading is a kind of distribution.73
http://media.www.dailyfreepress.com/media/
storage/paper87/news/2004/12/03/Opinion/Letter.To.The.Editor.Riaa.Cra
ck down.Attacks.creative.Freedom-821127.shtml (last visited Sept. 19,
2007).
65
. See, e.g., Boycott-RIAA, supra note 60; Dionne, supra note 64.
66
. RIAA V. PEOPLE, supra note 35, at 11–13.
67
. Id. at 14–15.
68
. AMANDA LENHART & SUSANNAH FOX, DOWNLOADING FREE MUSIC: INTERNET MUSIC
LOVERS
DON’T
THINK
IT’S
STEALING
5–6
(2000),
available
at
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Online_Music_Report2.pdf.
File
sharing was already a public issue by 2000. See notes 64–65 and
accompanying text. That file sharing has continued to increase suggests
that the public does not find file sharing morally unacceptable. Also, the
public may view copyright infringement as a malum prohibitum (wrong
because forbidden by law) offense rather than a malum in se (inherently
wrong) one. Lantagne, supra note 19, at 282.
69
. LENHART & FOX, supra note 69, at 6.
70
. Lantagne, supra note 19, at 280–81.
71
. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003).
72
. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
73
. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004,
1014 (9th Cir. 2001). It is important to note that making a file available
for downloading is not actual uploading, making controversial the RIAA’s
argument that merely “making available” is infringement. See BoycottRIAA, supra 63. But see Napster, 239 F. 3d at 1014 (stating that “users
who upload file names to the search index . . . violate plaintiffs’
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As a remedy for infringement, a copyright owner may
recover actual damages plus the infringer’s profits, or
statutory damages.74 The owner gets to recover one
award of statutory damages per individual work infringed
by the defendant.75 At its discretion, the court sets
damages within a range of $750 to $30,000.76 If the court
finds the infringement “was committed willfully,” the court
may increase the damages up to $150,000.77 On the other
hand, if the court finds that infringement was committed
innocently, it may reduce the damages to $200.78 The
standard for finding innocent infringement is high and file
sharers are not likely to meet it.79
If a jury tries a case, the jury can set the award of
damages,80 which is what happened in the recent case
against Jammie Thomas.81 The jury awarded damages of
over $9,000 per song (for a total of $222,000) against the
single mother, after having found her violation to be
willful.82 According to the plaintiffs’ attorney in that case,
the jury did not explain their verdict.83
In file sharing cases, the bulk of a statutory damage
award will be punitive in nature, if not in name, because
the minimum statutory award vastly exceeds actual
damage suffered.84 A critic has offered that these
damages may, through aggregation of awards for each in
a series of instances, violate constitutional due process.85

II. SOLUTIONS TO THE FILE SHARING PROBLEM
The ideal solution to the file sharing problem is one
that fulfills the needs of both consumers and copyright
distribution rights”).
74
. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2000).
75
. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2000).
76
. Id.
77
. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2000).
78
. Id.
79
. Barker, supra note 49, at 533–34.
80
. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 353
(1998).
81
. Freed, supra note 30.
82
. Id.
83
. Id. Although the jury awarded for each of twenty-four songs, the
record companies alleged she had traded 1702 songs. Id.
84
. Barker, supra note 49, at 525.
85
. See generally id.
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holders to the maximum degree that both sets of needs
are compatible. In the context of music commerce, what
copyright holders chiefly need is relief and protection from
thievery. They have justified expectations of payment for
their products, and they ought to be fairly compensated—
as they would be in standard commercial transactions
(e.g., purchasing a CD from a store). What consumers
chiefly need—what they are apparently unwilling to do
without—is efficient and convenient access to the music
they want. The challenge is to find some legal means of
accommodating both consumers and copyright holders.
Secondarily, this Note assumes a preference for
private over public solutions. Government regulation is a
heavy-handed tool. In a society where property and
freedom of contract are respected as between private
actors, the state has a peerless coercive power: the power
to compel behavior without providing anything of value in
return. This makes for a unique market immunity that is
more valuable in dealing with some matters—law and
order concerns, for example—than with others—matters
where what is “good” can be plausibly defined in market
terms.86 This Note assumes that the allocation of music
products and services is best served by a free, legally
secure market.

A. EXTANT PROPOSALS
Thinkers have put forward a number of proposals for
solving the file sharing problem. These proposals vary in
their practicality, effectiveness, and compatibility with
public morality.
1. Business as Usual or the RIAA Plan
The current approach to the file sharing problem is
the RIAA’s three-pronged attack of legal music services,

86

. Communist countries, such as the old Soviet Union and modern
Cuba, have suffered notorious supply failures due to their policy choice
that government decision makers, immune to market demands, should
decide who gets how much of what is to be supplied. See generally
THOMAS SOWELL, BASIC ECONOMICS 11–37 (3d ed. 2007). These failures might
have been avoided by letting prices, capacity to pay, and purchasing
priorities serve their natural functions, as they do under the free
market.
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education, and lawsuits.87 This strategy is a deterrencebased one, designed to persuade people not to share
music files illegally. Is any or all of this approach
effective? The RIAA claims that without the recording
industry’s efforts, there would be more illegal
downloading, and that “the industry’s efforts have made
an impact on attitudes, practices, cultural norms,
awareness and the business climate for legal services.”88
These claims are so modest and they make such intuitive
sense that it would be surprising if they were not true.
There are ego costs in doing something one knows to be
illegal, particularly when there are legal alternatives, and
there are financial and ego costs in risking lawsuits.
As the cost of a behavior increases, that behavior
should become less likely than it would be if its cost
stayed the same. Focusing on the litigation aspect,
Professor Sag has argued that the RIAA’s strategy of
targeting end-users, particularly including marginal and
sympathetic infringers, makes sense from a rational
choice perspective because the practice elevates the cost
of copyright infringement for those most likely to be
persuaded to switch from illegal to legal habits of
acquiring music.89
Regardless of the rationality of the theory supporting
it, the evidence is discouraging. According to a 2004
source, the percentage of Americans downloading music
files dropped by half since the RIAA began its user lawsuit
campaign in 2003.90 However, the data may have been
skewed by reluctance to report downloading caused by
publicity of the lawsuits.91 More recent data indicate that
since 2003 file sharing activity has more than doubled
after that initial drop.92 “[T]ens of millions of U.S. music
fans continue to use P2P networks and other new
technologies to share music.”93 So while it may be true
that the RIAA’s tactics are more effective than doing
87

RIAA, supra note 6.
Id.
89
Sag, supra note 18, at 155.
90
LEE RAINIE ET AL., THE IMPACT OF RECORDING INDUSTRY SUITS AGAINST FILE
SWAPPERS
1
(2004),
available
at
http://www.pewinternet.org/
pdfs/PIP_File_Swapping_Memo_0104.pdf.
91
. Id. at 3.
92
. RIAA V. PEOPLE, supra note 35, at 11–13.
93
. Id. at 13.
88

.
.
.
.
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nothing at all, the current approach has, at best, slowed
the growth of file sharing, and not actually diminished file
sharing.
The failure of the RIAA approach is probably not due
to failure to make users aware of copyright law and the
potential consequences of violating it. A 2004 poll of a key
group of music consumers, children aged eight to
eighteen, found that “[m]ore than half . . . with Internet
access continue to download free music even though they
know they are breaking the law . . . .”94 Although 88% of
those polled knew that popular music is usually
copyrighted, 56% of them downloaded music.95 A survey
of college students published in 2005 indicated that 70%
have downloaded music in violation of copyright,96 despite
awareness that there could be consequences.97 The EFF,
an RIAA critic, agrees with the assessment that the RIAA
has “increase[d] awareness of the copyright laws.”98
The failure may be due to the fact that the RIAA
approach is a deterrence-based strategy. Professor
Schultz explored this possibility in a 2006 article,
examining the theory and practice of deterrence in
relation to the file sharing problem.99 He advised that
deterrence is not effective due to the lack of consistency
with which file sharers are punished and the absence of
social norms, among file sharers, against copyright
infringement.100 Against the millions of file sharers, fewer
than 30,000 lawsuits have been filed.101 Deterrence
strategies are not just a matter of severity of punishment

94

. David
McGuire,
Report:
Kids
Pirate
Music
Freely,
WASHINGTONPOST.com, May 18, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A37231-2004 (last visited Oct. 18, 2007) (relying on a
Harris Interactive April 2004 poll, citation omitted in original).
95
. Id.
96
. MICHAEL GROSS, HIGHER EDUCATION UNLICENSED SOFTWARE EXPERIENCE—STUDENTS
AND
ACADEMICS
SURVEY
30
(2005),
available
at
http://definetheline.com/resources/BSA-Ipsos-Education-SurveyJune2005.pdf.
97
. Id. at 2.
98
. RIAA V. PEOPLE, supra note 35, at 13.
99
. Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll: What
Jambands Can Teach Us About Persuading People to Obey Copyright
Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651, 661–65 (2006).
100
. Id.
101
. Freed, supra note 30.
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but also certainty of punishment.102 As mentioned earlier,
Sag has noted the utility of litigating against marginal file
sharers.103 Such litigation increases certainty in
demonstrating that even small-time violators may be
targeted. However, the statistical unlikelihood of being
targeted remains great. If Schultz’s analysis is correct, it
would be impractically expensive to achieve the requisite
consistency of litigation against file sharers necessary for
a deterrence approach to be effective. Also, declining
press attention to RIAA lawsuits due to their being
commonplace may diminish the certainty of punishment
in the eyes of potential violators.104
Another factor to consider is the inadequacy of
legitimate online music services. Fully legal music
services, such as iTunes and the reformed version of
Napster, once carried high hopes of being strong medicine
for the file sharing problem.105
During the initial dip in file sharing, after the RIAA
began suing individual users, use of legal music services
rose.106 As of February 2006, Apple’s iTunes, launched in
2003, had already sold more than 600 million songs.107
iTunes offers customers the option of purchasing
individual tracks as well as entire albums for substantial
savings over the cost of purchasing a CD in a retail
store.108 The new Napster offers a subscription service
with unlimited downloads for a monthly fee.109 Napster
and iTunes are only the most well-known of legitimate
music services; there are others, including Yahoo! Music110
102

. SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES:
AND MATERIALS, 116–20 (7th ed. 2001).
103
. Sag, supra note 18, at 155.
104
. RIAA V. PEOPLE, supra note 35, at 13.
105
. See generally Lantagne, supra note 19, at 289.
106
. Eric J. Sinrod, RIAA Music Lawsuits Chill Online Downloading, USA
TODAY.COM, Jan. 14, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/columnist/
ericjsinrod/2004-01-15-sinrod_x.htm.
107
. Glenn Peoples, Your Rights Reserved?, MACWORLD, Feb. 1, 2006, at
22.
108
. Individual tracks cost $0.99 and albums cost $ 9.99. iTunes
Store, http://www.apple.com/itunes/store/music.html (last visited Mar.
22, 2008).
109
. Try
Napster
Free
for
7
Days,
http://www.napster.com/choose/index. html (last visited Oct. 21, 2007).
110
. Yahoo! Music, http://music.yahoo.com/ (last visited Oct. 21,
2007).
CASES
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and Real Networks.111 Music services offer streaming
media, downloads, cell phone ringtones, exclusive media,
and even free, user-friendly client programs for
downloading and managing music, video, and other
media.112
That these services have achieved some measure of
success and acceptance is clear. However, it appears that
these services, like the lawsuits, have merely slowed the
growth of illegal file sharing rather than actually
diminished it. The number of legal downloads through
these services is marginal compared to the number of
illegal downloads across file sharing networks.113 A 2006
article reported that the International Federation of
Phonographic Industries (IFPI), a recording industry trade
group, estimates that the ratio of illegal to legal
downloads is forty to one.114
The EFF has identified three flaws that make legal
music services inadequate substitutes for file sharing: “(1)
anti-consumer . . . restrictions[,] (2) limited inventory[,]
and (3) high prices.”115 Various features, such as Digital
Rights Manage-ment, restrict consumers from transferring
music from computers to other devices and prevent
consumers from accessing their music after discontinuing
subscription to a service.116 Music obtained through file
sharing is not hampered by such restrictions.117 Legal
services have limited catalogs that may exclude even
popular acts, such as The Beatles, as well as smaller
acts.118 File sharing is, at least in theory, not subject to
this limitation.119
111

. Products
and
Services
>
ASP
Services,
http://www.realnetworks.com/ products/asp/index.html (last visited Oct.
21, 2007).
112
. Id.
113
. RIAA V. PEOPLE, supra note 35, at 14.
114
. BBC
News,
Universal
Backs
Free
Music
Offer,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/business/5294842.stm (last visited Oct. 21,
2007).
115
. RIAA V. PEOPLE, supra note 35, at 14.
116
. Id.
117
. This statement assumes that the files users share are rendered
from CDs, DVDs, or other original sources through processes that do not
restrict transfer or use of the resulting data. Most discussions of file
sharing assume likewise. See, e.g., id. at 14–15.
118
. Id. at 15.
119
. Availability of music across file sharing networks is not limited
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The EFF’s criticism that legal music services charge
too much is its weakest. The nature of the free market
renders dubious any claim that a popular product is too
high-priced in any objective way. Such criticisms assume,
or at least appear to assume, that there is an objectively
“correct” price for a given thing. In reality, market prices
are information-conveying entities determined by realities
that are mostly, if not entirely, beyond a seller’s control.120
A detailed discussion of the economics of music pricing is
neither feasible nor necessary here. Plainly, any price,
whether a per-download fee or a monthly subscription fee,
is unattractive when the same product121 is available for
free—and without profit, the music industry would go
away altogether.
The RIAA approach appears to be ineffective. Millions
of U.S. citizens are violating copyright through file sharing.
Besides being ineffective, as discussed above, the RIAA
approach, through its litigation component, offends a
popular sense of decency and fairness.122
One of the RIAA’s essential problems is that its
business model is stuck in the past: the recording industry
is trying to force a potentially inconvenient purchase of
products that can be conveniently obtained for free
online.123 The RIAA’s practice runs contrary to the

by a pre-determined catalog. It is, however, limited by what other users
across the network make available. One of the advantages of legal
services is the reliable availability of their catalog, however limited by
licensing and storage space that catalog may be.
120
. See generally SOWELL, supra note 87. Prices convey information
about scarcity and demand. Id.
121
. Of course, a corrupted, virus-infected, or misidentified file copied
from another user is not the same product as a commercial service’s
well-formed, wholesome file that is what it purports to be.
122
. Public opinion is not monolithic, but the research for this note
uncovered little evidence of support in the general public for the RIAA
and its strategy. Evidence found did little or nothing more than affirm
the existence of intellectual property rights and the corollary right to
vindicate them. Supra note 62 and accompanying text. Such sentiments
are difficult to read as support for the RIAA’s strategy.
123
. See Lincoln Russell, Why We Love Google and Hate the RIAA,
ICRONTIC,
July
11,
2006,
http://icrontic.com/articles/why_we_love_google_hate
_riaa
(“[The
RIAA’s] profit margin lives and dies by whether they can get you to buy
the copies of the intellectual property they sell, rather than the free
ones you can find online.”).
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progress of technology.124 One key to the file sharing
problem may be to embrace the Internet’s power for
convenient and efficient exchange of information among
free actors who do not charge a fee for transactions. Such
a choice would be inherently more compatible with public
morality to the extent that the internet-using public has
adopted an ethos of sharing. One writer articulated the
normalcy of downloading this way: “The thing that I
always try to say to the movie and music executives
frothing at the mouth . . . is that everybody can’t be an
outlaw. If everybody does it, it’s normal rather than
aberrant behavior.”125 The recording industry should not
fight entrenched norms if it can find some way to leverage
them for profit.

2. Changing the Law
Some critics have proposed that the file sharing
problem be resolved by changing copyright law. One such
proposal is to reduce the duration of copyright.126 Critics
taking this tack focus on the original brevity of copyright
and its enormous dilation to its present length of virtually
two lifetimes.127 As they see it, keeping works out of the
public domain for such a great length of time does not
properly balance the interests of the public and of
creators.128 More importantly, they also argue that this
length of copyright is outside the Constitution’s “limited
124

. The progress of technology is not only the development of new
means of transmitting information, but also the way people choose to
use them. The famous popularity of free and accessible file sharing
client software such as Limewire, blogging services such as Blogger,
networking services such as MySpace and Facebook, and media sharing
services such as Flickr and YouTube reflect a “sharing ethos” that can
be summarized under the phrase, “the internet is for sharing.” See,
e.g., William Gould, Links, http://www. harmony.demon.co.uk/links.htm
(last visited Apr. 17, 2008). This phrase has become highly popular with
multiple variations findable with Google searches.
125
. Michael Wolff, Stop, Thief!, N.Y. MAG., Mar. 3., 2003, at 24, 26
(italics
original),
available
at
http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/media/columns/media life/n_8384/.
126
. See Dionne, supra note 64 (author’s criticism of current duration
of copyright and invitation to movement of like-minded individuals
imply that law should be changed).
127
. See, e.g., id. (“Copyright terms now last the creator’s lifetime
plus 70 years.”)
128
. Id.
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times” clause.129 Professor Ku has asserted that copyright
is no longer necessary due to new, more direct, means of
production (desktop) and distribution (digital), and that
intermediary content distributors (e.g., record labels),
protected by copyright, add no creative value.130
Under current constitutional jurisprudence, the merit
of the constitutional criticism is doubtful.131 The merit of
the public policy criticism is debatable. The U.S.
understanding of intellectual property appears to revolve
around economic incentive,132 and lengthy copyright
provides a major incentive to create artistic works. The
idea that this question is one of balancing private and
public benefits is simplistic, obscuring the notion that,
without incentives, people will not create in the first place.
That a broader public domain, and fewer works
altogether, would be more beneficial to the public is
doubtful.
Shrinking copyright duration is of dubious feasibility.
The trend over the course of U.S. history has been
expansion.133 Also, the private beneficiaries of copyright
have active and, reputedly, powerful lobbies.134 More
importantly, only a very drastic diminishment of copyright
duration—beyond the modest allowance of 1790—would
129

. Id. The relevant text states that Congress has authority to
secure exclusive rights to creators for “limited [t]imes.” U.S. CONST. art. I.
§ 8.
130
. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright:
Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
263, 295–300 (2002).
131
. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (holding that
the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act, extending copyright to author’s
lifetime plus seventy years, is not unconstitutional).
132
. The relevant portion of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8,
prefaces the operative clause with a utilitarian justification of promoting
“Progress of Science and useful Arts.” Id. Protection of copyright
institutes a financial incentive to create. See Kimberly Kerry, Music on
the Internet: Is Technology Moving Faster than Copyright Law?, 42 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 967, 986–87 (2002). The American public appears to think
of copyright as a financial, rather than a moral, matter. Lantagne, supra
note 19, at 283.
133
. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194–96 (noting that federal copyright was
fourteen years—exclusive of the permitted renewal—in 1790 and was
expanded under the 1909, 1976, and 1998 Acts).
134
. See Boycott-RIAA, supra note 61 (“Copyright reform will
undoubtedly be extremely difficult to achieve due to the fact that the
RIAA’s entire purpose is to lobby our government to change the law in
their favor.”)
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benefit the millions of users sharing music or movies of
recent vintage.135 Copyright duration appears to be of
little or no real relevance to the file sharing problem.
Also, while Ku’s argument about major record labels
being unnecessary to the recording of modern music is
likely true with respect to some kinds of music, it is likely
not true with regard to the chart-topping, highly
profitable, heavily produced music widely traded among
file sharers.136 The costly production, talent, and
equipment involved require greater resources than
independent recording artists are likely to have at their
disposal. Additionally, intermediary distributors serve
important functions of promotion and channeling
consumer choice137—functions that benefit both artists
and consumers. More importantly, copyright not only
enables the intermediary-dependent music business
model, for better or for worse; it also protects the rights of
content producers. Even with desktop studio production
and regionally or locally targeted internet distribution,
copyright is still necessary to protect against freeloading.
A more feasible proposal is copyright damages
reform. This proposal starts with the idea that aggregation
of statutory damages across multiple similar violations
can distort incentive to sue and impose, inappropriately,
“‘wholly
proportionate’
reprehensibility.”138
Such
aggregation may also violate due process.139
As to the first effect, “once the plaintiff has an
adequate incentive to sue, there is little need to increase
this monetary incentive by multiplying the penalty
thousands of times.”140 The idea is that the punitive
portion of statutory damages—the part that goes above
and beyond compensation—is often an important
motivator for plaintiffs to vindicate their rights, but this
motivational threshold is easily met and further incentive
135

. A commonplace assumption in discussions of music file sharing
is that the bulk of music being shared was recorded within the last
thirty years. See, e.g., Dionne, supra note 65 (“Arrhh! Time to be
illegally downloadin’ me Britney Spears!”).
136
. See Opderbeck, supra note 17, at 1746.
137
. Id.
138
. Barker, supra note 49, at 549.
139
. Id. at 526.
140
. Id. at 549.
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is unnecessary.141 As to the second effect, the argument is
that, because a major part of the defendant’s
reprehensibility comes from having committed to an
unlawful course of action, it is fairer to treat each instance
of a series of infringements as part of a larger scheme.142
A proponent of this reform noted that “an analogy can be
drawn between the criminal defendant who enters a store
and steals multiple items and the civil defendant who
installs file-sharing software and downloads many files.”143
As to due process, punitive damages may be so
grossly excessive as to violate it.144 The Supreme Court
has articulated three guideposts for deciding when a
damage award is grossly excessive: the reprehensibility of
the defendant’s conduct, the ratio of punitive damages
awarded to harm inflicted on the plaintiff, and a
comparison between the punitive damages awarded and
the criminal and civil penalties for similar misconduct.145
One proponent of statutory damages reform maintains
that aggregated statutory damages do violate due
process under the Court’s test, but that the courts will be
loath to overturn aggregated statutory damages, due to
“practical institutional considerations.”146
The proponent offered two congressional options for
reforming statutory copyright damages. Congress could
enact a statutory damage scheme permitting courts to
assign below the current damages floor in the aggregation
of many similar claims.147 Alternatively, Congress could
authorize a “specialized dispute resolution system” to
detect and punish illegal file sharing with greater
efficiency, imposing smaller penalties on a wider net of
the file sharing public.148
Statutory damages reform would alleviate some of the
apparent unfairness to file sharing defendants, but it
might also undermine the deterrence power of lawsuits—
141

. Id. at 549–52.
. Id. at 552–53.
143
. Id. at 553.
144
. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 459–62
(1993).
145
. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–85 (1996).
146
. Barker, supra note 49, at 554–56.
147
. Id. at 558.
148
. Id. at 559.
142
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something the RIAA values and is determined, for the time
being, to exploit. The RIAA and others invested in
deterrence strategies would likely lobby against such
reform.
What these proposals to change the law have in
common is an aim to protect file sharers from undesirable
consequences. Neither attempts to vindicate the infringed
interests of the copyright holders. Because the current
statutory damages structure is offensive, reforming it
could be a useful component in a comprehensive solution
that also addresses the needs of copyright holders.

3. Levies
One way to address the needs of copyright holders is
an alternative compensation system. The RIAA’s
characterization of music piracy as a kind of theft relies on
a misappropriation-of-value theory.149 Unlike theft of
tangible property or services, there is no taking of scarce
resources with alternative uses. The theft consists of the
fact that something of value (music) has been wrongfully
taken (infringing on exclusive rights) from its owner (the
copyright holder). In the context of music commerce, the
wrongful taking consists of copying music without paying
for it. Thus, for the principal concern of music commerce,
if copyright holders are compensated for the taking of
their property, the theft disappears and their rights are
vindicated.150
One alternative compensation system is for the
government to levy fees and pay copyright holders from
the proceeds. The levy system could permit the free flow
of information on P2P networks for “noncommercial
dissemi-nation, modification, and copying of works made
available to the public.”151 The revenue lost to copyright
149

. RIAA, supra note 11.
. On the other hand, profitable transactions, the principal concern
of commerce, necessarily implicates other concerns, such as control of
distribution. Control of distribution is an obvious artistic concern; an
artist may believe that a particular work is unique and, therefore,
deserving of limited release to devoted fans. Somewhat less obviously,
control of distribution is also a commercial concern because contrived
scarcity combined with high demand raises market value. The diamond
trade is the most notorious example of this principle in action.
151
. Lori A. Morea, The Future of Music in a Digital Age: The Ongoing
Conflict Between Copyright Law and Peer-to-Peer Technology, 28
150
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holders could be restored through fees on software,
services, or hardware related to copying or file sharing.152
There is precedent for analogous systems in other
countries and in the United States. In Germany, for
example, the law does not hold individuals liable for
making personal copies because there is a levy on the
sale of relevant copying and recording equipment and
media.153 In the United States, the Audio Home Recording
Act (AHRA) of 1992 barred claims against individuals
using “digital recording technology to copy music.”154 In
exchange for that immunity to individual consumers, U.S.
manufacturers had to pay a two percent tax on “digital
audio recording devices” and a three percent tax on
“digital audio recording media” to compensate copyright
holders.155 This tax is passed on to consumers in the form
of higher prices. The government would collect the
payments, and then divide the monies among the various
right holders, each of whom had to file a claim with the
Librarian of Congress.156 At the time of the AHRA, Digital
Audio Tape (DAT) and CD duplication appeared to be a
threat to the music industry due to their capacity to make
high quality copies of recorded music. The AHRA is largely
irrelevant to current challenges except by way of
example.157
In imitation of the AHRA, Congress could enact
legislation that bars suits against file sharers in exchange
for levies on computers, blank CDs, music players (e.g.,
iPods), or internet service. The proceeds from the
collected fees could be distrib-uted pro rata to copyright
holders based on a determination of how often their
content is downloaded and its retail value.
Abstractly considered, this solution appears almost
ideal. It grants users convenient and efficient access to
the music they want and compensates copyright holders
without the ugliness and inefficiency of lawsuits. As
CAMPBELL L. REV. 195, 239–40 (2006).
152
. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to
Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 43 (2003)
153
. Id. at 32.
154
. Morea, supra note 151, at 246.
155
. Id.
156
. Id. at 247.
157
. See id. at 247.
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applied, however, it presents some problems. If a broad
range of technology is subject to the levy, a broad range
of consumers will end up subsidizing the activities of a
small range of consumers.158 CDs and computers have
many uses other than file sharing, and, while file sharing
is widespread, only a minority of computer users share
files.159 Some commentators favor a levy on bandwidth as
use of bandwidth is related to file sharing,160 but even a
levy on bandwidth can be overbroad as plenty of
legitimate computer activities—such as network gaming—
are also associated with high use of bandwidth.161
“[B]andwidth usage is unlikely to constitute a reasonable
proxy for infringement.”162
Additionally, artists and record companies might learn
how to manipulate the tracking system to fraudulently
assign to themselves a greater share than they deserve of
the levy proceeds.163 More importantly, governmental
tracking of file sharing implicates privacy concerns and
the government’s involvement in the collection and
assignment of monies may stifle the development of
alternative content distribution systems that might better
fulfill the needs of some consumers but be ill-suited to the
government’s methods of determining downloads (or
whatever metric a levy system would use to discern
market share).

4. Large Scale Private Licensing
Another alternative compensation system, similar in
some respects to government levies, is large scale private
licensing, in which copyright holders would arrange,
directly or through intermediaries, with ISPs, educational
institutions, or end users for the right to freely trade files
in exchange for fees. A principal advocate for such a
system is the EFF, and its articulation is concise and easily
understood:
[T]he music industry forms one or more collecting societies,
which then offers file sharing music fans the opportunity to “get
158
159
160
161
162
163

.
.
.
.
.
.

Opderbeck, supra note 17, at 1749.
Morea, supra note 151, at 248.
Opderbeck, supra note 17, at 1749.
Id.
Id. at 1750.
Morea, supra note 151, at 248.
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legit” in exchange for a reasonable regular payment, say $5 per
month. So long as they pay, the fans are free to keep doing
what they are going to do anyway—share the music they love
using whatever software they like on whatever computer
platform they prefer—without fear of lawsuits. The money
collected gets divided among rightsholders based on the
popularity of their music. In exchange, file sharing music fans
who pay (or have their ISP or software provider or other
intermediary pay on their behalf) will be free to download
whatever they like, using whatever software works best for
them. The more people share, the more money goes to rightsholders. The more competition in P2P software, the more rapid
the innovation and improvement. The more freedom for fans to
upload what they care about, the deeper the catalog.164

There is precedent for something similar. The
American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers
(ASCAP), and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) collect fees from
broadcasters, performance venues, and eating and
drinking establishments in exchange for the right of these
entities to play “whatever music they like, from whatever
source, as often as they like.”165
The facial appeal of such a system is obvious. It has
the strengths of the levy model mentioned earlier: it is
technology-embracing, it provides consumers the access
they insist on having, and it ensures that copyright
holders get paid, while reducing lawsuits and without
having to tinker with copyright law. It also has advantages
over the levy model. It permits private actors to hash out
for themselves the terms of a bargain, which, besides
being likely to result in satisfactory terms, also gives the
parties involved a valuable feeling of control.166 It is also
free from the government intrusion of tracking downloads
or other file sharing activity.
Voluntary licensing is not without potential problems.
To work, the system would require the voluntary
cooperation of almost all rights holders so that end users
164

. RIAA V. PEOPLE, supra note 35, at 16.
. Id. at 17; see also Morea, supra note 151, at 236–37.
166
. Assuming the EFF model, the contracts for end users would most
likely be contracts of adhesion, granting the end user no opportunity to
bargain over terms. These adhesion contracts would, however, be the
product of more nimble bargaining among more equal parties (artists,
record companies, collecting societies, etc.) as to fee collection and
proration. More importantly, adhesion contracts are widely used in
situations where practicality calls for them and take-it-or-leave-it, while
not an ideal choice, is still a choice.
165
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will experience broad freedom from the threat of
lawsuits.167 Also, collection services, if too few, might
create monopolistic problems.168 There is also the matter
of determining fee proration to record labels and artists.
However, the music industry has already overcome similar
challenges in the previously mentioned licensing handled
by ASCAP and BMI.169
One complaint that could be raised against both levies
and voluntary licensing is that they do nothing to
vindicate the copyright holder’s right to control
distribution. To put the matter in perspective, at this time
copyright holders are not able to keep their work from
being distributed against their will and also are not able to
get profit from that unpermitted distribution. Being able to
at least get profit is better than nothing at all and is the
best available option until an effective method of
maintaining control comes along. Also, relinquishment of
control in exchange for a guarantee of payment is nothing
new to the music industry. There is compulsory licensing
in music recording in the United States; after public
release of a song, any individual can record that song for
a fee paid to the copyright holder.170
All things considered, large scale licensing appears
highly desirable for meeting the needs of both the
recording industry and music consumers, with the added
bonus of embracing and promoting the development of
technology. It promises to eliminate wasteful lawsuits
without requiring major changes to copyright law or major
increases in government regulation. It could easily serve
as the primary component of a comprehensive solution to
the file sharing problem.

5. Jambands and Reciprocity
Schultz believes that the deterrence strategy of
lawsuits against file sharers is not likely to succeed
because “it is very difficult to project threats of detection
and legal action credible enough to alter behavior.”171 He
posits that social norms, rather than threat of punishment,
167
168
169
170
171
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Morea, supra note 151, at 239.
Id.
See generally id. at 236–37.
Id. at 245.
Schultz, supra note 99, at 655.
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account for most lawful behavior.172 Under his view, a part
of the solution to the file sharing problem is fostering new
norms of respect for intellectual property.173 For insight as
to how this project might be done, he studied the
jamband culture and community.174 Jamband fans are
notoriously loyal and, apparently, lawful toward their
musical idols.
These fans scrupulously observe restrictions bands impose on
the copying and distribution of their music. They keep track of
these rules and make sure their fellow fans are aware of them.
If they find fellow fans stepping out of line, they quickly scold
them. They even cooperate with bands’ lawyers to enforce the
rules.175

Jambands have a distinctive policy toward intellectual
property. Fans are free to record, copy, and distribute live
performances.176 On the other hand, studio recordings and
commercial live recordings are off-limits, and the fans
abide by these rules.177 According to Schultz, the
community’s pro-copyright norms are not rooted in
circumstances unique to jambands, but in the principle of
reciprocity—cooperation
begets
cooperation.178
He
advocates that the music industry drop its current
practice of trying to sell collections of less desirable songs
on the basis of one or two hits per album in favor of
cultivating “loyal communities that have reciprocal
relationships with artists.”179 In these reciprocal
relationships, the recognized generosity, fairness, and
commitment of the artists elicit loyalty and respectful
conduct by music consumers.180 Community sanctions
against renegade behavior reinforce the good conduct.181
The
reciprocity
of
musician-fan
and
fan-fan
relationships in the jamband model is admirable.
Unfortunately, that model is so deeply antithetical to the
172

. Id.
. Id. at 655–56.
174
. Jambands are musical acts, such as the Grateful Dead, known
for live performances that include long improvisational stretches (“jam
sessions”).
175
. Id. at 653.
176
. Id.
177
. Id.
178
. Id. at 656.
179
. Id. at 657.
180
. Id. at 668–91.
181
. Id. at 717.
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modern music business—of which distance, impersonality,
and retail consumerism are essential features—that it
likely cannot be implemented on a broad scale in the
foreseeable future. On the other hand, Schultz
impressively sets forth an alternative vision for music as a
business that enterprising musicians may find compelling
and may choose to emulate regardless of what the
majority of other musicians do.
The principle of reciprocity itself is more immediately
applicable. If the music industry were to treat its
customers in a way its customers experience as more fair
and more generous, in reciprocation those consumers
would likely behave more respectfully of copyright.

6. Digital Rights Management
Digital Rights Management (DRM), mentioned
earlier,182 is a technological measure against illegal file
sharing that works by limiting the ability to use
downloaded music files.183
DRM sounds good in theory, but its performance is
disappointing. To begin, DRM does nothing to protect
against the illegal distribution of files created by users
from their own CDs or other music sources. Also, it is
possible to crack DRM encryption schemes and programs
that decrypt DRM-protected files are available.184
More importantly, DRM endows content providers with
the ability to restrict use of their content beyond what
copyright law guarantees.185 DRM, understandably, is
controversial. Apple’s Steve Jobs voiced his disapproval of
mandatory DRM and Apple’s iTunes store began to offer
DRM-free music.186 Other commercial online music
services sell unrestricted music as well.187
182

. See supra notes 36, 116 and accompanying text.
. Opderbeck, supra note 17, at 1750. One example is the Apple
Fairplay system, applied to iTunes downloads, which limits the use of
music files to five computers and also limits the number of CD burns of
a playlist. Id.
184
. Id.
185
. Id. at 1751.
186
. RIAA V. PEOPLE, supra note 35, at 15. iTunes now offers DRMfree music for the same price as DRM-encrypted tracks. iTunes Store,
supra note 108.
187
. Id. See, e.g., eMusic, Why Join?, http://www.emusic.com/promo/
why. html (last visited Jan. 6, 2008).
183
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DRM must be effective to some degree against file
sharing, as it prevents enjoyment of the misappropriated
music. However, it is only effective with regard to DRMencrypted files originating from legitimate music services.
It is useless against user-created files and non-DRM files
purchased online. Also, DRM restricts the ability of
consumers to make legitimate use of their music files. In
that restriction, DRM incentivizes illegal file sharing,
because a user-created or decrypted file that can be used
on any number of devices and burned any number of
times is more valuable than one limited by DRM. Given
the weakness and dislike of DRM, it is unattractive as part
of a solution to the file sharing problem.

B. AN INTEGRATED, COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION
A number of the proposed solutions to the file sharing
problem have both attractive features and weaknesses
that can be remedied by other proposed solutions. The
best way to approach the file sharing problem is to take
the good ideas and integrate them in such a way that
they complement each other, maximizing each other’s
strengths and shoring up each other’s weak points.
A licensing plan more or less similar to the EFF’s
proposal ought to be the core of an integrated,
comprehensive solution. This model meets the needs of
the music industry for fair compensation, and it meets the
needs of consumers for efficient, convenient access to the
music they want. It also promotes the development of
technology and does not require any radical changes to
existing law or any congressional action.
As an internal matter, the record labels and their
artists will need to work out a proration scheme, but this
challenge is not a new one for the music industry, and
artists and record labels will be motivated to come to
mutually satisfactory terms. More importantly, this model
is in the best interest of the music industry, because it will
empower the industry to profit by meeting a legitimate
need that is not currently met by legitimate means.
The music industry could form one or more collection
agencies that would, in turn, contract on one side with
record labels and independent artists and on the other
side with end users, ISPs, or educational institutions. It
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would be most efficient to contract with ISPs or
educational institutions where possible, and let those
entities deal directly with (e.g., contract with, collect frees
from) end users. In any case, agreements with end users
should be voluntary for the users.
Lawsuits could still be used against those users who
do not opt in to the program and continue to infringe
copyright. Large scale licensing and lawsuits would be
complementary in at least two ways. First, licensing
shrinks and identifies the pool of users the industry needs
to monitor for copyright infringement. If the collection
agencies contract with ISPs or other intermediary entities,
those entities could furnish lists of IP addresses of users
who are and users who are not participating in the
program.188 Right now, the RIAA’s detectives have a
limitless pool of potentially infringing users to track; a
diminished and better defined pool would make
enforcement easier.
Second, in the context of the generosity and fair
dealing the licensing model would likely represent to
consumers, the principle of reciprocity would, in addition
to attracting consumers to the program, diminish public
hostility to the music industry’s enforcement efforts and
make the RIAA and other copyright holders more
sympathetic plaintiffs and infringers less sympathetic
defendants.
With respect to the lawsuits themselves, damages
reform may or may not be in order as a constitutional
matter. The subject is worthy of further review and
analysis. Rights holders and their lobbyists would likely
object to damages reform for fear that it would diminish
the deterrence power of lawsuits. However, if file sharing
is legalized through licensing, as a matter of reciprocity
the resentment and rage directed against allegedly
excessive damages would likely diminish, anyway.
Large scale licensing could threaten the market share
of commercial online music services, but competition is
188

. Some of this policy may not be feasible depending on the
intermediary’s privacy obligations to users. It would be easy to obtain
permission to disclose identifying information from those users who opt
in as part of their voluntary contracts, but getting permission to disclose
identifying information for those users who decline to participate may
be considerably more challenging.
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ultimately beneficial to the public. Commercial services
will not necessarily be unable to compete with file
sharers. These services could still provide unique value in
the form of reliable availability of virus-free, uncorrupted,
properly identified files, something file sharers cannot
promise. They would also be free, as they are now, to
experiment with business models and filling niches in
order to maximize their profits. DRM, often associated
with legal music services, should be discarded. It prevents
consumers from making lawful use of their files and, more
importantly, with a licensing system in place, DRM would
be unnecessary and unfair to everyone participating in
the licensing system.
Lastly, artists and labels should consider changing
their practices to promote a sense of community and
mutually beneficial reciprocity with music consumers. The
organic community development enjoyed by jambands
may not be practical for most recording artists and labels,
but some means of promoting reciprocity are practical for
most artists and labels, such as freely distributing
alternate versions of songs or songs discarded from an
album’s final track list, and permitting live recording and
trading of concerts.

CONCLUSION
The file sharing problem can be characterized two
ways. From the music industry perspective, the problem is
that consumers are stealing music. From the consumer
perspective, the problem is that consumers do not have
legal access to the music they want that is as convenient
and efficient as they want. The industry’s approach to
dealing with the problem to date has been more
ineffective than not and has embittered or calloused a
substantial portion of the public. In particular, the lawsuit
component of the industry’s approach, besides being
ineffective, has proven highly repugnant.
In response to the perceived need for a less offensive
and more effective solution to the file sharing problem,
critics have suggested a number of alternative
approaches with various strengths and weaknesses. The
best approach to the file sharing problem is to integrate
the best ideas from the various proposals in a
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complementary
fashion, maximizing
each
other’s
strengths and remedying each other’s weaknesses. Large
scale licensing belongs at the core of such an integrated,
comprehensive solution. Lawsuits can be used as breach
measures against those consumers who do not opt in to
the program and continue to share files anyway. Legal
music services will be free to compete via alternative
business models, filling niches, and reliably providing
virus-free, uncorrupted, properly identified files.
The file sharing problem can be solved without
wasteful, unpopular lawsuits or major change to the law,
provided that the music industry is willing to adapt and
take cues from the consuming public. What is in the best
interest of both the industry and the consuming public is
to stop fighting an apparently unstoppable tide of
behavior and exploit it for growth and profit. The industry
has accomplished similar feats before with other large
scale licensing programs, and it should be able to do the
same with file sharing.

